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A comparison of the models and
methods of surveillance in East
Germany and Northern Ireland
and their relevance to modern-day
securitization of society
Cliodhna Pierce

Abstract
Despite increasing awareness of the rise in societal surveillance as a result
of leaks by former NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden and subsequent
revelations from Wikileaks, the damage of pervasive surveillance practices on
the individual and on communities has yet to be measured. As John Gilliom
has argued, ‘until we are able to generate sufficient research to make
plausible sense of how differently situated people – welfare mothers,
prisoners, students, middle-class professionals – speak of and respond to their
various surveillance settings, we will be unable to devise a meaningful
account of what surveillance is’ (2006, 126). Before we can examine the
impact and influence of surveillance on these or other segments of society, we
must examine the pervasive nature of general surveillance techniques. The
objective of this paper is to consider in detail the historical techniques of
government surveillance on communities in Northern Ireland (NI) and the
former East Germany (GDR). By looking at these two models of surveillance
societies, we can begin to compare and contrast the differences in strategies
used in a democracy and a dictatorship. Using these two examples of two
heavily surveilled communities, taking a detailed look at five techniques in
particular, we gain insight into the implantation of surveillance practices used by
184
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different political model structures. The aim is to explore the similarities and
differences in strategies used in both states, allowing us to assess the trajectory
of future surveillance tactics and its relevance in the securitization of society
today.

Introduction: Surveillance, power and risk-based profiling
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers – Article 19, The United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948
As historic and biblical narratives make plain, the idea of surveillance and the
need for it are not new. Links between surveillance power and control has roots
in biblical texts for example, the notion of the all-seeing, omnipresent God
creates the perception that our behaviour is constantly monitored. We may
therefore modify our actions in an effort to please the Almighty with virtuous
behaviour.
Today, most surveillance theory is focused on governmental use of surveillance
and its impact on shifting power dynamics resulting from the surveillance state.
In their thesis Imagining Security 2007, Wood and Sheering argue, ‘Power is
understood as being everywhere, not because it is exercised everywhere, but
because it is viewed as coming from everywhere’ (2007: 9).Foucault takes this
observation a step further, suggesting that power is a tool for modifying our
actions, making us compliant with states’ expectations of our behaviour: ‘Power
is not a thing but rather an anonymous strategy that is exercised via tactics and
techniques in concrete practices. The anonymity indicates power exists in action’
(2004: 14).
In light of the post 9/11 world and the rise of groups such as the Islamic State,
the need for proactive surveillance measures appears to outweigh our ability to
self-determine how our information is used. As Pfaff suggests: ‘Proactive
surveillance seeks out potentially dangerous individuals, conspiracies and
deviant opinions, before they act, are publicly expressed or put into action. A
sphere of privacy or right of personal conviction is not recognized or respected’
(Pfaff, 2001: 387).
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The securitisation of surveillance centred on enforcing rules and regulations has
overtaken its original function of protection. Our understanding of public
discourse, freedom of expression and boundaries between the individual citizen
and the State has fundamentally changed. Autonomy and existential action are
subject to hostile scrutiny and compliance has been redefined as ‘non suspicious’
behaviour. This new approach enables the state to justify forcing these rules on
its citizens so they can live a safer life. As Marc Schuilenburg points out: ‘Security
is an ordering concept. We order our lives in the hope of a safe existence’ (2015:
9).
The contemporary role of surveillance in preventing terrorist attacks must be
taken into account. Various stakeholders see risk-based profiling as an essential
component of the new strategy of preventative policing as, for example, Pat
O’Malley, quoting Colquhoun, maintains ‘the prevention of crimes and
misdemeanours is the true essence of police’ (O’Malley, 2010: 168). However,
Castel takes an alternative view, seeing this position as a two-dimensional
approach that does not take into account the full picture of the individual
targeted: ‘In the case of risk, the subject is deconstructed, so to speak, through
the use of statistical techniques. Thus, ‘surveillance is practiced without any
contact, or any immediate representation of the subjects under scrutiny’ (Castel,
1991: 288).
Given ongoing threats of violence posed by sectarian groups such as the
Provisional IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force, who carried out indiscriminate
bomb and gun attacks, the surveillance techniques and risk-based profiling used
in Northern Ireland arguably became an indispensable tool for preventing
possible terrorist threats. However the Catholic population were perceived as
the greater threat to security and became the main targets for surveillance
operations. In the case of East Germany (German Democratic Republic or GDR),
surveillance helped identify threats to the state apparatus; however, as nearly
everyone was seen as a risk, the task became so monumental that it also became
unsustainable. In light of the new risk-based policing strategy, the state powers
must ensure a balanced approach. Surveillance must be carried out in way that is
seen to be just, fair and proportionate if it is to be deemed legitimate in the eyes
of those under surveillance, often the general public at large.
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There are growing concerns among critics about the levels of intrusion by
surveillance stakeholders into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. Much of
the work currently undertaken in the area of surveillance studies suggests that,
while there have been many positive policing results from the new surveillance
techniques, disadvantaged groups are often disproportionately targeted. In
McCahill and Finns’ work on risk-based profiling, they point out that ‘[i]n the
context of policing and criminal justice, surveillance powers continue to be
disproportionately directed towards those shorn of economic and cultural capital
in a way that reinforces existing social divisions’ (2014: 175).
With security services’ use of criminal profiling, this form of social sorting is
leading to people often becoming targets of surveillance because of their
background or how they look, regardless of how they behave. Many academics
such David Lyon in his work on Everyday Surveillance also argue that this form of
profiling, reinforces stereotypes, creating social divisions in many communities.
Conservative critiques suggest that surveillance is not sinister or coordinated but
that it is an inevitable and organic consequence of the manner in which the
threat presents itself. Radical critique by contrast would argue that in fact this
further alienates and divides society, acting as a threat multiplier however
unintentional. As Neman and Hayman note,
‘social sorting’ highlights the classifying drive of contemporary
surveillance. It also defuses some of the more potentially sinister aspects
of surveillance processes (i.e. it’s not a conspiracy of evil intentions or a
relentless and inexorable process). Surveillance is always ambiguous
(2013: 167).
In the case of Northern Ireland, the minority Catholic populations was seen as
the greater risk to security and, as a result, was disproportionately targeted,
further fuelling community division. In the GDR, however, everyone was seen as
a risk to the state, and no one was exempt from coming under the scrutiny of the
Stasi.
It must be noted, however, that modern surveillance is all encompassing in
nature, which sees all citizens as being enemy of the state or the ‘Other’. As
David Lyon suggests, this allows for little trust by the government in its own
citizens: ‘Those in positions of authority do not trust or are seeking grounds to
trust those below them’ (2002: 37). It can be said that in Northern Ireland and
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East Germany under the Stasi, the state chose not to trust its citizens and as a
result normalized surveillance states emerged.

Background
To compare surveillance strategies used in GDR and Northern Ireland, the history
of and rationale for surveillance operations in these two states must be taken
into account. Both cases can be examined and analysed through Foucault’s
model of surveillance outlined below.
In traditional models of surveillance power flows from the surveyors
(government or corporate actors) to the surveyed. In this concept, power
is something possessed by an authority that is ‘exerted over things’,
which can ‘modify use, consume or destroy’ (1982, p.786).
The East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi,
implemented a frightening regime of surveillance, infiltration and terror for over
40 years. Its sole objective was to control citizens and prevent the growing tide
of emigration to West Germany that nearly caused the economic collapse of the
East German communist state. By creating an atmosphere of fear, disharmony
and mistrust, it hampered spontaneous communication and social cohesion
critical for change.
Many people believe this omnipresent surveillance by state actors in the GDR
contributed to the collective compliance of citizens in this repressive system.
Solove, in his book Ubiquitous and Pervasive Computing, quotes Justice Cohen to
the effect that our individuality is lost in the idea of persistence state of
monitoring: ‘[P]ervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the
margin, incline choices toward the bland and the main-stream’ losing as she
describes ‘the expression of eccentric individuality’ (Solove, 1972, p. 156).
In contrast, the Northern Ireland surveillance state was the result of civil rights
protests by the Catholic minority looking to end discriminatory voting, housing
and employment policies. Their demands led to intensifying political tension and
intercommunity

violence

between

the

Protestant/unionist

and

Catholic/nationalist communities. This, in turn, resulted in the deployment of the
British Army to quell the waves of violence, terrorist attacks and street protests
that gripped the region. Its aim was to end violence and restore order through
on-the-ground tactical surveillance strategies. The British establishment

188

Irish Communications Review vol 16 (2018)

however, based on past colonial experience, chose a coercive militarised
response to what was a civil liberties and rights-based issues to begin with. This
provocative and militarised policing exacerbated the roubles essentially
becoming a threat multiplier. Many similarities can be drawn with today’s police
forces facing increasing threats from radical elements of society, as O’Malley and
Hutchinson imply when they note that ‘the development of police as a quasimilitary form of organization and the growth of a police culture … emphasizes[] a
form of masculine heroism’ (2007: 385).

An analysis of five surveillance techniques
The following section will consist of a detailed analysis of five common
surveillance techniques used in both Northern Ireland and East Germany. These
techniques will be discussed and categorised using Johnston and Shearing’s five
characteristics of the securitisation of the state, as mentioned in Governing
Security and outlined below:
Order: the way citizens ought to be, set of explicit and implicit norms
about acceptable public behaviour.
At least one willing actor active in the programme ensuring supervision,
control and order maintenance. Formal or informal organisation.
Personal instruments of the actor: communication skills, intelligence and
charisma.
Tools and technologies: a whole range of innovative inventions or
discoveries.
Physical instruments: eavesdropping, searching premises and inspecting
posts.
If the surveillance techniques of these states and their implementation are
examined in detail, it can be seen that the methods used in both cases are
strikingly similar despite differences in their underlying rationales.

1. Order: technique – internment and imprisonment
The threat of jail as a result of information gathered through pervasive
surveillance practices has been used by regimes for decades with great success.
In many cases, within the strategy of a zero-tolerance policy, the threat of jail is
often used as a deterrent to criminal activity. Schuilenburg observes that in the
scenarios where zero-tolerance policies are implemented ‘directions of problem
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resolution such as prevention and extensive control mandates are regarded as
being more effective in preventing evil than those classic control methods of
criminal justice’ (2015: 33).
Foucault also observed that ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and
permanent visibility … assures the automatic functioning of power’ (Foucault,
1977: 201). Many commentators raise concerns about the encroachment of
private firms in the criminal justice system and see this as the beginning of the
commodification of surveillance and security. Private security sees it operational
focus in terms of profit and loss, not with regard to the benefit of society as a
whole. As Shearing and Stenning note, there has been an ‘emergence in the
private sector of a more instrumental form of control in which environments
[are] being constructed in order to minimize opportunities for unwanted
behaviour’ (Shearing & Stenning, 1985: 301).
In East Germany, this tactic evolved after the region’s post–Second World War
annexation by the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the 1950s, the focus was on
violent repression of the opposition, which led to the imprisonment and torture
of political activists. From the 1970s to the fall of the GDR, the focus moved away
from physical torture to psychological intimidation. This often led to muchpublicised show trials that, for many, ended in convictions and jail without any
legal representation. According to research undertaken by Maercker and
Schützwohl, ‘By recent estimates, approximately 180,000 individuals were
imprisoned for political reasons in the former GDR’ (1997: 436).
In Northern Ireland, the threat of jail as a means of restoring social order was
introduced with the policy of internment without trial. This policy saw the
minority Catholic population targeted through surveillance; this resulted in many
of its community members subjected to long periods of indefinite incarceration
without any legal protections. Although some of those interned had terrorist
connections, many innocent citizens endured similar torturous techniques as
those used in the GDR state security, and as a result, they became radicalised. Ed
Moloney states that a staggering two percent of Derry City’s 50,000 Catholic
population was imprisoned for IRA activities in the years between 1971 and
1986’ (2007: 20).
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2. Active player: technique – citizen surveillance
Alongside the increased securitisation of streets across the UK and Europe, the
use of innovative collaborations, such as community watch programmes, are
being actively promoted by local police forces. We are increasingly encouraged
to be the eyes and ears of police patrols, who urge us to flag potential suspect
behaviour. In conjunction with these community-based initiatives, the media
also calls on the public to help track down possible targets suspected of criminal
behaviour through what many consider citizen surveillance.
Marc Schuilenburg, whose work has developed many of the surveillance
assemblages that dominate today’s urban landscapes, cites ‘the input of
knowledge and experience by concerned inhabitants in order to enable a more
distributive and more effective form of security observance’ (2015: 48). Tops in
his 2007 paper analysing local political environment in Rotterdam takes this
increased securitisation of society one step further, suggesting there is now an
increasing intertwining of community, policy and crime prevention: ‘There are no
project managers but rather urban marines, no goals but rather target, no
neighbourhood teams but rather intervention teams no security policy but
security approach’ (Tops, 2007: 293).
Many see this citizen surveillance approach as divisive in nature because it
enforces societal stereotyping and does not take the context of the suspicious
behaviour into account. As Feeley and Simon argue in their comparison of old
and new constructs in penology (a section of criminology that deals with the
philosophical and practical): ‘While the Old Penology tried to identify criminals to
ascribe guilt and blame and to impose punishment and treatment, the New
Penology seeks techniques for identifying, classifying, and managing groups
sorted by levels of dangerousness’ (1994: 180). Lee and Stenson add, that public
spaces today, ‘consist of the myriad ways in which populations and spaces are
investigated, classified and formulated as objects and concerns for government’
(2007: 4).
It can be said that this creates division within communities as it establishes the
idea of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. ‘Within the articles themselves, the targets of
surveillance were specifically Othered; through linguistic strategies that separate
them; from the rest of us’(McCahill & Flynn, 2014: 32).
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Similarly, the Stasi co-opted, forced and encouraged its citizens to watch each
other on an unprecedented scale. By 1988, the Stasi had over 90,000 full-time
Stasi operatives and a further 105,000 informers. Its extensive network of agents
permeated all spheres and institutions of daily life, from psychiatric clinics to the
judicial system. This sense of an all-seeing, all-watching surveillance state acted
as an instrument of control over its citizens. Department V oversaw these
operations; its main function was to identify dissension, halt resistance activities
and expel or jail political opponents. The mandatory denunciation law, which
had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, made failure to
denounce fellow citizens a crime that could result in a jail term of up to five
years.
Gathering intelligence in Northern Ireland was more challenging than it was in
GDR. This was due to the inherent suspicion of close-knit communities about
those conducting surveillance activities. The bulk of intelligence information was
obtained through on the ground visible, overt sources, such as stop and
searches, indiscriminate house raids, and curfews. This enabled the British Army
to compile profiles of people’s familial and political associations. It was also able
to identify ‘visitors’ and those who appeared out of place.
As, Zurawski has noted, ‘citizens of Northern Ireland have been far more
conscious of the presence of surveillance cameras for longer than those in the
rest of the United Kingdom’ (2005: 499).

3. Personal instrument: technique – infiltration
The infiltration of civic groups has been used extensively for centuries as
governments sought to control dissent and restore order. In the case of both
Northern Ireland and East Germany, this tactic was used frequently both to
gather information and to identify targets. The infiltration of civic communities
became so great in Eastern Germany that it had the effect of inflating dissident
groups’ membership base: ‘The issue is further complicated by the paradox that
there were so many IM’s (Informal Collaborators) it actually helped the
opposition movement, partly simply by swelling its ranks, but also by actively
working on opposition activities’. (Miller, 1997:194).
In his book The Firm, Bruce interviews Matthias Piekert, a former Stasi
informant, who provides an insider perspective into this fixation with IMs: ‘[T]his
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obsession with informants and their reports was the greatest weakness of the
Stasi: it led to poor quality reports on the population and distracted from duties
of safeguarding economic and military sites’ (2010:63).
In Northern Ireland, the practice of infiltration was more targeted and tactical as
opposed to a wide spread invasive strategy used in East Germany. Nonetheless,
the techniques for coercing people into becoming informants and the
undercover operations that took place within terrorist organisations were similar
to those used in the GDR. That said, during The Troubles infiltration and
surveillance techniques were used by all sides. The PIRA (Provisional Irish
Republican Army) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) used surveillance to
determine potential targets for terrorist operations and to obtain tactical
knowledge of the enemy. For the British Army, surveillance was a necessary
technique to identify imminent terrorist threats; however, the surveillance
operations were primarily focused on the Catholic community. As Bamford
remarks:
In some cases, the security forces recruited young Catholic males in their
early teens and persuaded them to join the PIRA (Provisional Irish
Republican Army). Urban estimated that between 1976 and 1987, the
security forces received information from approximately 50 informers.
Penetrating the group at a number of levels had several benefits, the
most important being that if one agent was compromised, others
(unknown to him or her) would remain in place. (2005:592)
British Security forces also allowed attacks to go ahead and even mounted terror
attacks themselves, the Miami Showband massacre being one high profile
example. This raises huge ethical questions about the role the army played in
instigating terrorist campaigns, which further ignited violence on both sides.
Writing in 1977, Paul Wilkinson observed that a ‘dangerous consequence of a
large and ill-controlled secret intelligence and subversion apparatus is that it may
end up recruiting assassins and ‘dirty tricks’ operators for special assignments’,
adding that the danger was that the organisation could get ‘out of control’
(Wilkinson, 1977:136).

4. Tools and technologies: technique – a. innovative technologies
We are more aware today than ever before of how the use of innovative
surveillance

technologies

has

infiltrated

our

daily

lives,

from

the
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commodification of our web searches that lead us to online purchases that
algorithms ‘think’ we should make, to tracking devices on our phones that can
reunite us with them with a click of a button. This surveillance has bled into our
streets with the evolution of CCTV cameras. Many of us are unaware that we are
under the constant watch of security forces as soon as we enter our city centres.
As Pat O’Malley and Steven Hutchinson suggest, ‘In a host of mundane ways
using innocuous or covert devices such as railings, cameras, gates and signposts,
authorities were ‘invisibly’ channelling people into orderly and conforming
behaviour, focusing not so much on disciplining individuals but on regulating
mass distributions and flows’ (2007: 373).
In their study Surveillance, Capital and Resistance, McCahill and Flynn imply that
media reporting reaffirms the belief that through innovative new technologies
we are being watched in a similar fashion to people living in East Germany and
Northern Ireland during the 1970s and ‘80s: ‘Within these articles surveillance
technologies act as tools to reveal that they are among us’(2014: 30).
The technological innovations used by the Stasi in East Germany have been well
documented, ranging from breaking into and bugging the apartments of
opposition leaders to the use of sophisticated listening and recording devices
planted in obscure places. As Anna Funder describes in Stasiland, the Stasi
deployed technical innovations with great success:
A flower pot, a watering can, a petrol canister, and a car door, all with
cameras of varying sizes hidden in them. Examples of these include a
thermos with a microphone in its lid, a hiking jacket with a camera sewn
into the lapel pocket, and an apparatus like a television antenna that
could pick up conversations 50 meters away in other buildings or while
you were in your car stopped at lights.(Funder, 2003: 71)
These tactics were subtle and often implemented ‘under the radar’ so that the
community remained largely unaware of them. Despite rumours of mass
surveillance, they remained difficult to prove. The constant perception of being
watched acted as a deliberate psychological strategy designed to instill fear and
mobilise control.
This situation differed considerably from the strategy used in Northern Ireland,
where the main purpose of surveillance was allegedly to restore social order in
the face of increasing violence. However, for many it was seen as a bold
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statement of ‘you are occupied’, ‘we are in control’. By making technology visible
to the civilian population, such as with CCTV cameras and patrol cars, people
were very much aware that they were being observed. They were, therefore, less
willing to risk punishment by causing trouble in those areas that were obviously
being watched. It should be noted that, at the beginning of the Troubles, the
focus of surveillance was on predominantly Catholic communities with
nationalist leanings, thus further inflamed tensions.
In a study on the use of intelligence in Northern Ireland, Bamford gives a detailed
picture of the technologies used:
The system included: the use of helicopters for border surveillance; the
introduction of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) to patrol and to
man covert observation posts in South Armagh; the use of ‘Listeners’ and
‘Watchers’ along with ‘bugging’ devices in most public places; as well as
the capability of more intrusive methods, such as planting ‘bugging’
devices in specified targets’ homes and vehicles. (2005: 594)

4. Tools and technologies: technique – b. data collection
With the advent of the digital age, we are now at a crossroads in terms of
surveillance. Governments now have the ability to access our information
through a variety of technological innovations, with little or no protection or
transparency for citizens in terms of how this information is used. As Parsons
maintains, ‘intersubjective-based privacy model registers that aggregated
metadata can be deeply harmful to a given person’s or community’s interests
and even provoke individuals to retreat based on fears of potential
discrimination’ (2015: 6).
However, O’Malley and Hutchinson see this new ‘data-veillance’ as an important
innovation from a crime-prevention perspective:
Whereas the collection of crime data had previously been linked primarily
to issues of the social causes of crime, in new developments they were
being used to inform the identification of risk factors, typified by the
practice of situational crime prevention. In place of evidence on ‘broken
homes’, ‘anomie’ or ‘zones of transition’ – with their implications for
social justice concerns – the new statistical evidence related to security,
to the identification of criminogenic situations. (2007: 374)
Similar traits of this new move towards modern data collection practices can be
seen in methods used to accumulate the notorious Stasi files. The pervasive
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nature and extent of the data collection resulted in a paper legacy of 178
kilometres of filed material. The information contained in these files came from
reports, direct contacts with targets and mail interception practices. Since 1991,
Stasi victims have had access to their files, which has led to their discovery that
close personal friends and family had been Stasi informants. By allowing access
to these files, victims of Stasi now have full discloser of any surveillance
operation carried out on them or their families by the orders of the state. This
has had a beneficial impact in helping unified Germany move forward in the
process of truth and reconciliation. In Northern Ireland by contrast, lack of
transparency and accountability has seen many family’s awaiting justice for their
loved ones for decades.
Much of the information gathered in the Stasi files detailed the banal, day-to-day
lives of targeted individuals. The sheer volume of information often led to
inaccurate and incompetent analysis of the targets, as Barbara Miller suggests:
‘IM’s were engaged in the amassing of vast amounts of often seemingly trivial
pieces of information which could potentially be used in the operative
Zersetzung (decomposition, corrosion, undermining) of the enemy’ (1997:18).
In Northern Ireland, data collection methods of surveillance can be understood
from Bamford’s analysis of the British Army’s land operations, heavily influenced
by Britain’s colonial past: ‘good observation, constant patrolling and the quick
passage of information’ were considered relatively simple ways to acquire
background information. According to Keith Maguire, those activities enabled
the army to build ‘a street-by-street and family-by-family analysis of the no-go
areas’ (2005: 587). It is interesting to note that the document Bamford used for
his analysis was intended for military operations but the tactics were applied to
policing strategy used against the citizens of Northern Ireland.
Solove argues that this intrusion into the personal sphere through bulk data
collection leads people to become virtual prisoners: ‘Such supportive relations,
networks, and forms of life are denied to persons and populations subject to
persistent and pervasive surveillance; the collection and retention of personal
information can cause people to become prisoners of their recorded pasts and
lead to deliberate attempts to shape how their pasts will be remembered’ (2008:
746). Unlike the days of literal wiretapping, when authorities needed human
agents to listen in, digital intelligence is today an agent in its own right.
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5. Physical instruments: technique – border security
There is no more comprehensive way of keeping people under surveillance than
by controlling and restricting their movements. With the current influx of
refugees and migrant workers, there is increasing pressure on government
agencies to control borders. Border control is fast becoming a tool to control the
flow of citizens while marking out others for surveillance. Schuilenburg highlights
the significant role that space and flow represents to current policing strategy:
‘The increased significance of “the space of flows” advocates… a different
organisation of police function. Now taking the disappearance of borders and
high mobility as a starting point, the police will have to pay more attention to
flows and locations where flows converge, the so called nodes.’ (2015: 34). It can
be argued that, given the importance placed on this aspect of securitisation,
instead of disappearing, borders are remerging not only as a political tool such as
with the Brexit negotiations but also one used to combat potential terrorist
threats. The Trump election campaign for example, clearly demonstrated how
rhetoric focused on terrorism can be used to mobilise discourses around the
issue of border security. It ignores the fact that most terror threats are internal
not external.
Zizek suggests that this type of control disproportionally affects those individuals
seen as a risk due to the increased use of profiling by security forces. Those with
both economic and cultural capital are thus oblivious to the impact this has on
those targeted. Profiling like surveillance leaves vulnerable citizens open to
hostile scrutiny.
On the one hand the cosmopolitan upper and middle class academic,
always with the proper visa enabling him to cross borders without any
problems in order to carry out his (financial academic…….) business and
thus able to ‘enjoy the difference’; on the other hand, the poor
(im)migrant worker driven from his home by poverty or (ethnic religious)
violence for whom the celebrated hybridality designates a very tangible
traumatic experience never being able to settle down properly and
legalize his status (Zizek, 1999: 220).
In East Germany (GDR) during the 1950s, one-quarter of the population decided
to emigrate to West Germany. In response, the Berlin Wall was erected to stop
this enormous flow, which was proving catastrophic to the fragile economy.
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Special restrictions were imposed along the East German–West German border,
which regulated the movements of those living in the GDR. Through visas,
passports and other difficult-to-navigate documentation, the border police could
track citizens’ movements, whom they were visiting and the purposes of their
visits. The state security used maximum force along the border wall, which
resulted in the deaths of 825 people killed trying to flee: ‘East Germany had
become a giant prison. Those still trying to get out risked being blown to bits by
landmines and automatic artillery devices along the western border. Border
guards had orders to fire on anyone trying to scale the wall’ (O’ Koehler, 1999:
374). Similar parallels can be seen today as borders are increasingly closed in
order to curb what many refer to as the emerging migrant crisis in Europe.
In Northern Ireland, the building of walls was subtler, completed over a longer
period with the main purpose of separating the two polarised communities.
However, the walls had the added benefit of controlling people’s movements
into and out of certain areas. This control of movement helped the army build
profiles of suspect individuals augmenting the intelligence that had already been
gathered. The ironically named ‘peace walls’ have come to be seen as a symbol
of the Troubles, a barrier to integration and a contentious issue that further
fuelled suspicion on both sides.

Conclusion
While the era of the modern surveillance state provides many with a sense of
security, some fear that the danger lies in the potential for local communities to
be exclusively governed in the name of security. Marc Schuilenburg suggests that
‘[t]he punishment of harmful behaviour is only important when it leads to a
reduction of risk’ (2015: 37).
The two kinds of techniques have been identified by Von Hirsch and Shearing.
The first is based on personal profiling where ‘[i]t is assumed that certain
individuals have specific characteristics that indicate a heightened risk of criminal
behaviour. The second technique, based on exclusion, ‘is directed towards
rebuffing of people who have been already convicted of violating certain rules’
(Hirsch & Shearing, 2000: 162). These two techniques hold within them the
possibility of creating a disenfranchised population due to increased use of police
profiling. It can be argued this was the case in Northern Ireland, where the
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Catholic population was seen as the potential threat. In East Germany, on the
other hand, every citizen who spoke out in defiance of the state was seen and
looked on with suspicion; in other words, everyone was a potential target.
When looking at the context in Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance
had the same aim of rooting out all opposition and controlling dissent and
dissonance by voluntary or forced compliance: ‘The function of the secret police
in such regimes is not only to root out opposition and discourage dissent but to
regulate the political and moral conduct of both ordinary citizens and
functionaries of the state’ (Pfaff, 2001:400). While in Northern Ireland secret
police were not prevalent, the British Army carried out a similar function.
In both cases, Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance became part of
day-to-day life. Its presence became a normalised and accepted intrusion into
the private sphere of its citizens. However, as Stephen Pfaff suggests in his piece
on the limits of surveillance, this acceptance of surveillance is not guaranteed
long-term, as can be seen in the historical experiences of Northern Ireland and
Eastern Germany: ‘Such a regime may secure compliance so long as its power
seems unassailable, but once its authority is threatened it may suddenly
experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of the popular sentiments’
(2001: 21). Pfaff also provides a stark warning to governing powers, noting that
‘[f]or the most part, policymakers should focus on past examples of harm, but
they should not ignore undeniable indicators of future harm’ (Pfaff, 2001: 21).
As Christopher Parsons emphasises in Beyond Privacy, in a world where all our
communications have the possibility of coming under surveillance, ‘The crux of
the argument is that pervasive mass surveillance erodes essential boundaries
between public and private spheres by compromising populations’ abilities to
freely communicate with one another and, in the process, erodes the integrity of
democratic processes and institutions’ (2015: 1).
Taking these case studies as examples, we can gain insight into how modern-day
surveillance techniques can impact our society. It is worth noting that the
chairwoman of the US Federal Trade Commission Edith Ramirez warned in her
keynote speech at the Consumer Electronics Show that, in the near future,
‘Many, if not most, aspects of our everyday lives will leave a digital trail [that]
will present a deeply personal and startlingly complete picture of each of us –
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one that includes details about our financial circumstances, our health, our
religious preferences and our family and friends’ (Ramirez, 2015).
We must be cognizant in a world that is overwhelmed by the perception of the
imminent terrorist attack this fear is not exploited by the state to exert its
control over citizens. As David Lyons warns, ‘the idea of exploiting uncertainty in
the observed as a way of ensuring their subordination has obvious resonance
with current electronic technologies that permit highly unobtrusive monitoring
of data subjects in a variety of social contexts’ (Lyon, 1993: 655).

References
Ackerman, S. (2013, July 17). NSA warned to rein in surveillance as agency
reveals even greater scope. Retrieved 02 19, 2017 from The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/Jul./17/nsa-surveillance-househearing
Ash, T. G. (2009). The File - A Personal History (Second Edition ed.). London:
Atlantic books.
Bamford, B. W. C. (2005). The role and effectiveness of intelligence in Northern
Ireland. Intelligence and National Security, 20(4), 581–607.
http://doi.org/10.1080/02684520500425273
Bruce, G. (2010). The Firm The Inside Story of the Stasi (First Edition ed.). Oxford:
Oxford Press.
Castel, R. (1991). From Dangerousness to Risk. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, P. M.
Mille, & C. G. Michel Foucault Author(s) Graham Burchell (Ed.), The Foucault
effect: studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with
Michel Foucault (p. 281- 298). London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Collins, E. (1997). The Killing Rage. London: Granta Publications.
Coogan, T. P. (2002). The Troubles - Ireland’s Ordeal and the Search for Peace
(First Edition ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Feeley, M., & Simon, J. (1994). Actuarial justice: The emerging new criminal law. In D. Nelken, The futures of criminology (pp. pp. 173–201).). London: Sage
Publishing.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punishment: The birth of the prison. New
York: Pantheon Books.
Foucault, M. (2004). Society Must Be Defended’ Lectures at the College de
France, 1975-76. New York: PICADOR.

200

Irish Communications Review vol 16 (2018)

Funder, A. (2003). Stasiland. London: Granta Books.
Garland, D. (2001). Crime and Social Order in Contemporary - The Culture of
Control. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hirsch, A. V., & Shearing, C. (2000). Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational
Crime Prevention - Exclusion from public space. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Hirschman, A. O. (1982). Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action
Twentieth-Anniversary Edition. New Jersey: Princeton Press.
Lee, J., & Stenson, K. (2007). Security, Sovereignty, and Non-State Governance
‘From Below’ (Vol. 22). Ottowa: Canadian Law and Society Association.
Lyon, D. (2001). Surveillance Society - Monitoring Everyday Life. London:
McGraw-Hill Education.
Lyon, D. (2002). Surveillance as social sorting. Surveillance as social sorting:
Privacy, risk and automated
discrimination. http://doi.org/10.1177/1440783306061355
Maercker, a, & Schützwohl, M. (1997). Long-term effects of political
imprisonment: a group comparison study. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric
Epidemiology, 32(8), 435–42. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-5415.2009.02608.x
McCahill, M., & Finn, R. L. (2014). Surveillance, Capital and Resistance: Theorizing
the Surveillance Subject. New York: Routledge.
McCahill, M., & Flynn, R. L. (2014). Surveillance, Capital and Resistance:
Theorizing the Surveillance Subject Studies in Crime and Society). (1. Edition, Ed.)
London: Routledge Press.
McKittrick, D., &McVea, D. (2012). Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the
Northern Ireland Conflict (2nd Edition ed.). London: Penguin Books.
Moloney, E. (2007). A Secret history of the IRA (Second Edition ed.). London:
Penguin Books.
Newburn, T., & Hayman, S. (2013). Policing, Surveillance and Social Control: CCTV
and Police Monitoring of Suspects. London: Routledge Press.
O’ Koehler, J. O. (1999). The Untold Story of the Stasi Secret Police. Oxford:
Westview Press.
Olmstead vs United States, 277 U.S. 438 (US Supreme Court June 4, 1928).
O’Malley, P. (2010). Crime and Risk. London: Sage Publications.
O’Malley, P., & Hutchinson, S. ( 2007). Reinventing Crime Prevention - Why Did
‘Crime Prevention’ Develop So Late? British Journal of Criminology , 47 (3), 373389.

201

Irish Communications Review vol 16 (2018)

Parsons, C. (2015). Beyond Privacy: Articulating the Broader Harms of Pervasive
Mass Surveillance. Media and Communication, 3(3),
1. http://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v3i3.263
Pfaff, S. (2001). The Limits of Coercive Surveillance Social and Penal Control in
the German Democratic Republic. Punishment and Society, 3(3).
Philipsen, D. (1998). We Were the People: Voices from East Germany’s
Revolutionary Autumn of 1989. London: Duke University Press.
Ramirez, E. (2015). Ubiquitous data collection. Nevada: Consumer Electronics
Show keynote.
Schuilenburg, M. (2015). The Securitization of Society: Crime, Risk, and Social
Order. (D. Garland, Ed.) New York: NYU Press.
Shearing, C., &Stenning, P. (1985). From the Panopticon to Disney World: The
Development of Discipline. Canada Law Book, 335-349 (1), 335-349.
Solove, D. J. (1972). Nothing to Hide: The False Trade off Between Privacy and
Security. Yale: Yale University Press.
Solove, D. J. (2008). ‘ I ‘ ve Got Nothing to Hide ‘ and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, (May), 745–772.
Tops, P. (2007). Regime Changing In Rotterdam. Amsterdam: Atlas.
Wilkinson, P. ( 1977 ). Terrorism and the Liberal State. London: Thee Macmillan
Press Ltd.
Wood, J., & Shearing, C. D. (2007). Imagining Security. London: Routledge Press
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology.
London: Verso publications.
Zurawski, N. (2005). ‘ I Know Where You Live !’ – Aspects of Watching ,
Surveillance and Social Control in a Conflict Zone. Surveillance & Society, 2(4),
498–512.

202

